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A B S T R A C T
Previous research has demonstrated that in-group favouritism occurs not only in higher-level judgments such as
reward allocation, but also in low-level perceptual and attentional tasks. Recently, Moradi, Sui, Hewstone, and
Humphreys (2015) found a novel effect of in-group bias on a simple perceptual matching task in which football
fans responded more efficiently to stimuli newly associated with their own football team than stimuli associated
with rival or neutral teams. This result is consistent with a robust self-bias effect in which individuals show a
large performance advantage in responding to stimuli associated with the self over stimuli associated with a
close friend or a stranger (Sui, He, & Humphreys, 2012). The present research utilised a perceptual matching
paradigm to investigate the relations between self and in-group prioritisation amongst a sample of college
rowers. Across two experiments, we demonstrated a reliable performance advantage for self and team stimuli.
We also found a relationship between the self and team advantage in RT, and demonstrated an overlap in the
perception of self- and team-associated shapes that was stronger in participants who reported a greater sense of
group identity with their team. Further, we found no relation between the team bias and positive valence
implicitly associated with the team, showing that the team bias effects are unlikely to be driven by emotional
significance. The results are consistent with an overlap between self and in-group representation, which may
provide evidence for a common process driving both self and in-group perceptual advantage effects.
1. Introduction
A great deal of evidence suggests that socially relevant information
is given high priority in cognitive processing. Research has found that
personally significant distractors are harder to ignore than neutral ones
(e.g., Welford & Morrison, 1980; Wood & Cowan, 1995) and encoding
information in relation to the self has repeatedly been shown to en-
hance memory performance (Cassidy & Gutchess, 2012; Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Cunningham, Turk, Macdonald, & Macrae, 2008;
Turk, Cunningham, & Macrae, 2008). A bias for the self is also observed
in perceptual judgments such as facial recognition, with recognition
faster (Keyes & Brady, 2010; Sui, Zhu, & Han, 2006) and orientation
judgments enhanced (Sui, Liu, & Han, 2009) for own faces than faces
belonging to others.
While this research has consistently shown that self-relevance
modulates many forms of attentional and perceptual processes, the
experiments have typically used highly familiar stimuli such as faces
and names and so it has been difficult to isolate the effects of social
relevance from effects of familiarity on performance. However, a series
of recent studies demonstrated that newly made associations of the self
and personally familiar people to neutral stimuli enhances their per-
ceptual processing (Sui et al., 2012; Sui, Rotshtein, & Humphreys, 2013;
Sui, Sun, Peng, & Humphreys, 2014). In a novel paradigm, participants
learned to associate geometric shapes (e.g., square, circle and triangle)
with social labels (‘self’, ‘friend’ and ‘stranger’) by being told, for ex-
ample, ‘you are the triangle, your best friend is the square and a
stranger is the circle’. Following this short learning phase, participants
then had to judge whether shape-label pairs subsequently presented
very quickly on the computer screen conformed to the original pairings
or not by responding with keys for yes and no. There was a large self-
prioritisation effect, whereby shapes that were initially matched to the
self were responded to faster and more accurately than shapes that were
associated with others. Self-associated stimuli also showed weaker ef-
fects of stimulus degradation, consistent with perceptual processing
being enhanced (Sui et al., 2012). Follow-up research using fMRI found
that the self-matched shapes were associated with enhanced activity in
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brain regions linked to self-representation and social attention (the
vmPFC and LpSTS), while other-matched shapes recruited a dorsal
frontoparietal control network (Sui et al., 2013). The research demon-
strated that tagging novel stimuli with self-relevance can rapidly direct
attention and enhance perception and, most importantly, that these
effects are not rooted in stimulus familiarity.
As well as giving high priority to information relating to the self,
human cognition is also largely biased to material relating to social in-
groups. Like self-associated information, preference for the in-group
affects a wide range of psychological processes, with greater empathetic
responses (Johnson et al., 2002; Xu, Zuo, Wang, & Han, 2009), more
favourable reward allocation (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, &
Flament, 1971) and a higher likelihood of ascribing complex emotions
(Leyens et al., 2000) to in-group than to out-group members. Further-
more, similar to biases for the self, biases for the in-group also extend to
lower level perceptual tasks such as facial recognition (Brigham,
Bennett, Meissner, & Mitchell, 2007; Cassidy & Gutchess, 2012; Michel,
Corneille, & Rossion, 2007). A recent research study that utilised the
matching paradigm described above (from Sui et al., 2012) explored
whether in-group associations modulated perceptual matching for
neutral stimuli in the same way as associations with the self did (Moradi
et al., 2015). Football fans learned to pair the badges of the team that
they supported, a rival team and a non-rival (neutral) team with newly
associated geometric shapes (e.g. ‘your team is the circle, the rival team
is the square and the neutral team is the triangle’). Following this stage,
they then responded to random shape-badge pairs presented on screen
very quickly as being correct or incorrect according to the previously
learned associations. As for self-associated stimuli, a large advantage
for reaction time and accuracy was found for shapes that were matched
to participants' own team badges compared with shapes matched to
rival and non-rival badges. Control experiments verified that these ef-
fects were not based on increased familiarity for stimuli associated with
participants' own team badges, showing that the enhanced performance
truly reflected social value. This conclusion was further supported by a
positive correlation between the in-group advantage in perceptual
performance and satisfaction with the team ratings on Leach et al.'s
(2008) multi-component group identification scale. That there was no
difference in responses to neutral and rival out-groups suggested the
effects were rooted in in-group favouritism rather than out-group de-
rogation.
Prior research thus shows that social significance, such as relevance
to the self or an in-group, plays an important role in directing attention
and enhancing perceptual processing. Perhaps then, the shared effects
of self and in-group relevance on low-level cognition are driven by a
common process that stems from a shared representation. This would
imply that prioritisation for the self predicts prioritisation for the in-
group, and vice versa. Alternatively, in-group prioritisation in this
context may be driven by a component distinct from the self, such as
emotional or motivational significance inherent in the concept of the
group. Many social psychological theories are rooted in the premise
that the psychological self extends to include other people and social in-
groups such that group memberships form a vital part of self-re-
presentation. This forms the basis of social identity theory (Tajfel,
1982) and theories that have followed, such as self-categorisation
theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) and optimal
distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991). In addition to social identity
theory and its successors, the theory of identity fusion has more re-
cently been proposed as a unique form of alignment with a group such
that in certain individuals or under specific circumstances, the personal
self and the social self become completely at one (Swann, Jetten,
Gomez, Whitehouse, & Bastian, 2012). In cases of identity fusion,
boundaries between the personal and the social self are highly blurred
and individuals are likely to care as much about group outcomes as self
outcomes, which can lead to extreme forms of pro-group behaviour
(Gómez & Vázquez, 2015).
Further, there is experimental evidence to support the notion that
the in-group is cognitively represented as a part of the self. For example,
Smith and Henry (1996) asked participants to complete questionnaires
relating to traits about themselves, an in-group and an out-group and
then had them make yes/no self-descriptive judgments on a computer
on the same traits. They found that traits on which the self matched the
in-group were responded to faster and more accurately than traits on
which the self and in-group mismatched, showing a cognitive overlap
between self and group representation. There was no effect of matches
or mismatches to the out-group. The reverse effect was also demon-
strated, with judgments about in-group characteristics facilitated when
they matched the self (Smith, Coats, & Walling, 1999). The effect was
further demonstrated for attitude as well as trait judgments and was
positively correlated with explicit measures of group identification,
such that participants who showed a large reaction time facilitation
effect tended to report high levels of social identity, a greater desire for
closeness with the in-group and higher perceived in-group similarity
(Coats, Smith, Claypool, & Banner, 2000). This evidence led to the
proposal of a connectionist model for self and in-group representation.
Using the basic architecture of an Interactive Activation and Competi-
tion model (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981), Smith et al. (1999) con-
ducted a small-scale simulation such that self and in-group (or partner)
nodes were connected by bidirectional positive links which were also
connected to certain traits via positive or negative links. The process of
answering a question about whether a certain trait described the in-
group (or partner) was then modelled. When a trait was positively
connected to both in-group and self, there was a much greater activa-
tion level (which corresponds to a faster behavioural response time)
than when the trait was connected to the in-group alone. Furthermore,
when the self-group link was strengthened (or weakened) to reflect
perceived closeness with (or distance from) the group, the effect in-
creased (or decreased) accordingly. Thus, the connectionist model
predicted the observed behavioural results and strengthened the con-
clusion that representations of self and others are not stored as isolated
and independent structures but are linked by direct connections in-
dicating the strength of relationship and also by indirect connections
through commonly shared traits. These experiments provide evidence
for a shared cognitive representation of the personal and social self. In
this case, we might then expect this overlap to manifest itself at the
perceptual level too, with attentional prioritisation for the self (within
the perceptual matching paradigm described above), predicting atten-
tional prioritisation for the social in-group.
The present research explores whether the self and in-group biases
in visual perception, measured by perceptual matching (Moradi et al.,
2015; Sui et al., 2012), are driven by overlapping representations of self
and in-group information. Evidence for an overlap between self and
group in higher-level processes such as trait judgments has been de-
monstrated (Coats et al., 2000), but is this also relevant to effects on
lower-level, perceptual and attentional processes? If so, we would ex-
pect to see a positive correlation between the self and in-group ad-
vantages in performance on the perceptual matching task. We might
also expect more difficulty in discriminating between newly-learned
self and in-group stimuli than, for example, self and rival group stimuli.
The two experiments reported here utilised the perceptual matching
paradigm described above (Sui et al., 2012) to explore the relationship
between the self- and team-oriented advantages in visual perception in
a sample of college rowers. In Experiment 1, participants performed
two separate matching tasks: one in which they learned to associate
self, friend and stranger labels with three separate geometric shapes,
and the other in which they learned to associate team, rival and neutral
labels with three different geometric shapes. In both tasks, participants
had to respond to randomly presented shape-label pairs as correctly or
incorrectly matched according to the previously learned associations
(learned earlier, at the beginning of the experiment). Performance ad-
vantages were taken as the differences in reaction time and in accuracy
between self/team shapes and ‘non-self’ (the average of friend and
stranger) and ‘non-team’ (the average of neutral and rival) shapes, and
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the relationship between the self and team advantages was in-
vestigated. In addition to the perceptual tasks, subjective measures of
perceived closeness and overlap between self, friend and stranger, and
team, rival and non-rival were assessed using a questionnaire to assess
whether ‘friend’ and ‘stranger’ labels are comparable to ‘rival’ and
‘non-rival’ labels within the perceptual matching tasks (i.e., whether
they serve as equivalent baselines for measuring the performance
advantages). Experiment 2 investigated the self and team perceptual
advantages when the self, stranger, team and rival associations were
made within the same task. This allowed us to explore the similarities
between the self and team advantages when both self and group stimuli
were salient at the same time, while also controlling for potential
problems associated with order effects. Furthermore, this version of the
task made it possible to explore the overlap between self and in-group
perceptual processing by comparing mismatched trials for which self
shapes were matched with team labels to those when self shapes were
matched with rival labels. The second experiment also assessed the
effects of explicitly reported group identification and further used im-
plicit association measures (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) to investigate
whether the enhanced performance for the team in the matching task
reflected implicit positive valence associated with the team. We hy-
pothesised that a shared process driving the two kinds of advantage
effects would be reflected in a positive relationship between the per-
ceptual advantages for self and team. Additionally, we conjectured that
an overlap between self and in-group representations would mean
greater difficulty in discriminating newly-learned self and in-group
stimuli when presented in mismatched pairs than, for example, self and
rival mismatches. A slower RT and higher error rate for self-team pairs
than self-rival pairs, or team-self pairs than team-stranger pairs, would
be indicative of a cognitive confusion between self and in-group stimuli.
2. Experiment 1
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Participants
College rowers were recruited by email advertisements. Based on
prior work, eighteen participants was determined to be the minimum
sample size required to observe a group-level difference between the
critical condition means with a power of 0.80, alpha = 0.01. We aimed
to double this sample size for a meaningful correlational analysis, with
30 as the minimum adequate number based on work by Stolte,
Humphreys, Yankouskaya, and Sui (2017). A total of 49 rowers from a
range of College rowing teams2 completed the experiment. Seven par-
ticipants were excluded on the basis of having chance levels of accuracy
across both perceptual matching tasks (accuracy rate < 0.55), because
chance level scores would render bias measures meaningless. This left a
total of 42 (30 female, mean age = 22.36 ± 1.06), all of whom were
right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Informed
consent was obtained from all participants prior to the experiment.
2.1.2. Stimuli and tasks
Two perceptual matching tasks adapted from Sui et al. (2012) were
performed by each participant and completed sequentially, with half of
the participants performing the personal-association task first and half
the group-association task first. In the personal-association task, parti-
cipants learned to associate three geometric shapes with self, friend and
stranger labels and then had to judge if randomly presented shape-label
pairs were correctly or incorrectly matched according to the initial
associations. The shape-label pairings were firstly made by an on-screen
instruction (e.g. ‘you are the square, your best friend is the circle and a
stranger is the triangle’). Following this brief learning phase, the com-
puter task began. In each trial, participants were presented with a
central fixation cross for 500 ms after which a randomly-generated
shape-label pair was presented for 100 ms. Participants then had
1100 ms to respond whether the shape-label pairing was matched
correctly or incorrectly by pressing keys m and n (counterbalanced for
yes and no responses) and feedback (correct or incorrect) was given on
the screen for 500 ms at the end of each trial. The task consisted of 6
blocks of 60 trials (excluding 12 practice trials at the beginning) and
overall accuracy was given at the end of each block, along with an 8-
second break. There were six conditions within the task: two match
conditions, matched/mismatched; and three shape conditions, self,
friend and stranger. The whole task took approximately 15 min.
The group-association task had exactly the same format as the
personal-association task other than participants learned to associate
three different geometric shapes with labels of their own rowing team, a
rowing team that they considered to be a rival, and another rowing
team that they considered to be neutral to theirs, a non-rival. The
names of the three teams were reported to the researcher by email
before the session and the computer task was adjusted accordingly such
that each participant made shape associations with their own unique
choices. The associations across both tasks between the six shapes
(circle, hexagon, octagon, pentagon, square and triangle) and the six
written labels (self, friend, stranger; team name, rival team name and
neutral team name) were counterbalanced across participants along
with task order. The shapes used in the personal-association task were
always different from the shapes used in the group-association task. In
both tasks, the geometric shapes (each 3.8° × 3.8°) were presented
randomly above a white fixation cross (0.8° × 0.8°) against a grey
background at the centre of the screen, with a matched or mismatched
label presented simultaneously below the central fixation point. The
experiment was run on a PC using E-Prime software (version 2.0) and
displayed on a 17-in monitor.
2.1.3. Personal distance and IOS measures
To assess the perceived closeness between self, friend and stranger
or own, rival and non-rival teams, participants completed a personal
distance scale developed by Sui et al. (2012) and the inclusion of the
self in the other scale (IOS), developed by Aron, Aron, and Smollan
(1992). The personal distance scale asks participants to mark two points
on a straight line to represent where the two individuals in each
question (i.e., self and friend, self and stranger or friend and stranger)
fall in relation to one another. The distance between the two marks (in
mm) then serves as a measure of the perceived closeness between the
individuals. We also used this method to measure perceived closeness
between the three teams in question (i.e., team and rival, team and non-
rival and rival and non-rival). Smaller scores indicate a closer percep-
tion of the relationship between the two individuals or teams. Partici-
pants also completed the IOS, which presents seven pairs of circle that
vary in the overlap between them such that the first picture shows no
overlap and the last almost total overlap. Participants are asked to se-
lect the pair of circles that best represents the relationship between
themselves and the other individual (each represented by a circle). We
asked participants to complete three versions of this task (self-friend,
self-stranger and self-stranger) along with a modified version to assess
overlap between own, rival and non-rival teams. Higher scores on this
scale imply greater overlap.
2.1.4. Procedure
Participants first performed the two association tasks, the order of
which was counterbalanced such that half of the participants performed
the personal-association task first and half of the participants performed
the group-association task first. Following the two perceptual matching
tasks, participants then completed the self and team personal distance and
then the IOS scales. The experiment took approximately 1 h in total and
participants were remunerated at a rate of £10 per hour for their time.
2 We acknowledge that the correct term in rowing is a ‘crew’ rather than a team.
However, since team biases were explored by Moradi et al. (2015), and since the phe-
nomena are general, team-related ones, we use the term team in this article.
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2.2. Results and discussion
For the reaction time analysis only correct responses were included,
and those higher or lower than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean
reaction time for each participant under each condition were excluded
as a standard way of removing the influence of outliers. This elimi-
nated< 5% of the overall dataset. The analysis was then performed on
the remaining trials. Sensitivity was measured using a signal detection
approach whereby matched and mismatched trials for each shape were
combined to give a measure of d prime (Green & Swets, 1966), and the
response criterion (C) for each participant was also calculated
(Macmillan, 1993).
2.2.1. Reaction time scores
There were three within-subject variables: task type (personal/
group), shape category (high priority: self/team; mid priority: friend/
neutral; low priority: stranger/rival) and match condition (matched/
mismatched). A 2 (task: personal/group) × 3 (shape condition: high/
mid/low priority) × 2 (matched/mismatched) repeated measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test for the effect of shape
association on reaction time (RT) scores. Note: RT scores in mismatched
trials were based on the shapes (not the labels) in order to control for
the effects of word frequency between the labels.
There was no significant effect of task type, F(1, 41) = 1.41,
p= 0.242, ηp2 = 0.033, showing that RTs were similar for the personal
and the group association tasks. There was a significant effect of shape,
F(2, 82) = 65.11, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.614, with RTs fastest for high-
priority shapes, (M= 694.98 ± 8.94), followed by mid-priority
shapes, (M= 727.70 ± 9.84), and slowest for low-priority shapes
(M= 734.55 ± 9.78). Pairwise comparisons revealed that significant
differences existed between high- and mid-priority shapes and high-
and low-priority shapes (both p < 0.001), but not between mid- and
low-priority shapes (p= 0.215). There was also a significant effect of
match condition, with faster responses made for matched than for
mismatched trials, F(1, 41) = 254.33, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.861.
There was no significant interaction between task and shape, with
the effect of shape on RT consistent across personal and group asso-
ciations, F(2, 82) = 1.08, p= 0.345, ηp2 = 0.026. Similarly, there was
no significant interaction between task and match condition, F(1, 41)
= 0.23, p= 0.881, ηp2 = 0.001. There was a significant interaction
between shape and match, F(2, 82) = 52.97, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.564,
showing a differential effect of shape on RT according to match con-
dition. There was also a significant three-way interaction between
shape, match and task type, F(2, 82) = 9.51, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.188,
indicating that the interaction between shape and match on RT was also
dependent on task. To decompose these interactions, one-way repeated
measures ANOVAs were performed separately on matched and mis-
matched conditions for both task types.
Within the personal association task, there was a significant effect of
shape condition on matched trials, F(2, 82) = 53.70, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.567, but not on mismatched trials, F(2, 82) = 2.46, p= 0.091,
η2 = 0.057. For matched pairs, self shapes were responded to sig-
nificantly faster than friend shapes and also stranger shapes, and friend
shapes were responded to significantly faster than stranger shapes (all
p < 0.001). RTs within the group association task followed a similar
pattern, with a significant effect of shape condition on matched, F(2,
82) = 35.43, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.464, but not mismatched, F(2, 82)
= 0.83, p= 0.442, η2 = 0.020, trials. For matched pairs, team shapes
were responded to significantly faster than neutral and rival shapes
(both p < 0.001). However, there was no difference between neutral
and rival shapes (p= 1.00), unlike for friend and stranger shapes in the
personal task.
In summary, the RT data analysis found that for matched pairs, self
and team shapes were responded to significantly faster than the other
shapes. While friend shapes were responded to significantly faster than
stranger shapes, there was no difference between neutral and rival
shapes. See Fig. 1a for a bar chart depicting RTs for matched and
mismatched trials under each shape condition, and Table 1 for mean
and standard deviation (SD) scores.
2.2.2. D prime and response criterion
A 2 (task: personal/group) × 3 (shape: high/mid/low priority) re-
peated measures ANOVA found that there was no significant effect of
task on d prime scores F(1, 41) = 0.44, p= 0.511, ηp2 = 0.011, in-
dicating that sensitivity was comparable across both association types.
There was a significant main effect of shape, F(2, 82) = 58.08,
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.586, with sensitivity greater for high than for mid
and low priority shapes (both p < 0.001), but with no difference be-
tween the latter two (p= 0.413). There was a marginal interaction
between task and shape, F(2, 82) = 0.79, p= 0.086, ηp2 = 0.058.
Separate one-way repeated measures ANOVAs performed on each
task type found a significant effect of shape for the personal task, F(2,
82) = 16.23, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.284, with self shapes responded to
with greater sensitivity than friend (p= 0.002) and stranger
(p < 0.001) shapes. Sensitivity scores were generally higher for friend
than for stranger, but this was not significant (p= 0.186). Similarly,
there was a significant effect of shape on sensitivity within the group
association task, F(2, 82) = 35.71, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.466, with
greater sensitivity for team than for neutral and rival shapes (both
p < 0.001), but with no difference between the latter two (p= 1.00).
Similar to the RT data, the d prime scores demonstrated performance
advantages for self compared to friend and stranger and for team
compared to neutral and rival. When Bonferroni-adjusted, there were
no significant differences in sensitivity between friend and stranger
shapes or between neutral and rival out-group shapes. See Fig. 1b for a
bar chart depicting sensitivity scores for each shape condition, and
a) Mean RT scores for each shape condition under
matched and mismatched trials (Experiment 1):
b) Mean d prime scores for each shape condition
(Experiment 1):
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Fig. 1. a Mean RT scores for each shape condition under matched and mismatched trials
(Experiment 1): b: Mean d prime scores for each shape condition (Experiment 1).
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Table 1 for means (SD).
The same analyses were performed for response criterion data (C).
There was a marginal effect of task, F(1, 41) = 3.43, p= 0.071,
ηp2 = 0.077, with a slightly lower C adopted for the group
(M=−0.02 ± 0.032) than the personal (M=−0.09 ± 0.03) as-
sociations. There was a significant effect of shape, F(2, 82) = 16.48,
p= 0.001, ηp2 = 0.287, with a lower C for high than for mid
(p= 0.003) and low (p < 0.001) priority shapes, and also for mid than
low priority shapes (p= 0.058). Additionally, there was a significant
interaction between task and shape, F(2, 82) = 4.47, p= 0.014,
ηp2 = 0.098.
For personal associations, there was a main effect of shape on C, F(2,
82) = 37.30, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.476, with a significantly lower C for
self than stranger (p < 0.001) and friend than stranger (p= 0.002),
but with no difference between self and friend (p= 0.167). There was
also an effect of shape on C for group associations, F(2, 82) = 5.01,
p= 0.009, η2 = 0.109, with a significantly lower C for team than for
neutral (p= 0.017) and rival (p= 0.047) shapes, but with no differ-
ence between the latter two (p= 1.00). Therefore, for personal asso-
ciations, a lower C was adopted for both self and friend compared to
stranger shapes, while for group associations, a lower C was adopted for
team compared to neutral and rival shapes.
2.2.3. Correlations between self and team advantages
The results indicated that performance was enhanced for self-asso-
ciated shapes in comparison to friend and stranger and for team shapes
in comparison to neutral and rival shapes in both RT and sensitivity.
Next, we investigated whether the advantage in performance for the
self was correlated with the advantage in performance for the team. In
order to calculate the self advantage score for RT, the two non-self
conditions (stranger and friend) were averaged together and the self
score was deducted from this for each participant. To calculate the self
dprime advantage for each participant, the two non-self conditions
were averaged together and then deducted from the self score. The
team advantage scores were calculated in the same way, taking the
difference between the team and the averaged non-team conditions
(rival and neutral). Bias corrected and accelerated bootstrap 95% CIs
are reported in square brackets.
There was a significant positive correlation between the self and
team advantage in reaction time, rs = 0.339 [0.023, 0.543], p= 0.028,
but not in sensitivity, rs =−0.105 [−0.448, 0.235], p= 0.509. A
scatterplot showing the correlation between the self and team ad-
vantages in RT in comparison to ‘non-self’ and ‘non-team’ respectively
is presented in Fig. 2.
2.2.4. Personal distance and the inclusion of the self in the other scale
One participant did not complete the personal distance (PD) scales
and so the sample size for this analysis was 41. The mean scores for
subjective distance between each pair of individuals and teams along
with the perceived overlap between these pairs are shown in Table 2
(below). These measures were significantly correlated such that the
closer each pair of individuals was rated on the PD scale (i.e., smaller
distance), the greater the perceived overlap between them on the IOS
scale. These correlation coefficients are also shown in Table 2.
A 2 (personal or group) × 3 (pairing: self-friend, self-stranger,
friend-stranger or team-neutral, team-rival, neutral-rival) repeated
measures ANOVA was used to explore differences in perceived personal
distance (PD) between the pairs of individuals and groups. There was
no significant effect of personal vs. group, F(1, 40) = 0.82, p= 0.372,
ηp2 = 0.020, however there was a significant effect of the pair type, F
(2, 80) = 57.22, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.589, and also a significant inter-
action between the two, F(2, 80) = 29.52, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.425.
One-way repeated measures ANOVAs performed separately for personal
and group pairs were used to decompose the interaction. For personal
distance scores, F(2, 80) = 106.20, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.73, the distance
between self-friend was rated as significantly smaller than that between
self-stranger and friend-stranger (both p < 0.001), but there was no
difference in ratings of distance between self-stranger and friend-
stranger (p= 0.661). For group distance scores, there was only a
marginal effect of pair type, F(2, 82) = 2.52, p= 0.086, η2 = 0.058.
There was no difference in perceived distance between team-neutral
and team-rival (p= 0.215), or between team-rival and neutral-rival
(p= 1.00), but the distance between team-neutral was significantly
closer than between neutral-rival (p= 0.007).
A similar 2 (personal or group) × 3 (pairing: self-friend, self-
stranger, friend-stranger or team-neutral, team-rival, neutral-rival) re-
peated measures ANOVA was used to explore differences in IOS scores
between the pairs of individuals and groups. There was a significant
effect of personal vs. group, F(1, 41) = 7.82, p= 0.008, ηp2 = 0.160,
and of pair type, F(2, 82) = 87.39, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.681, and there
was also a significant interaction between the two, F(2, 82) = 58.97
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.590. For personal IOS scores, F(2, 82) = 257.74,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.863, the overlap between self-friend was sig-
nificantly greater than for self-stranger and friend-stranger (both
p < 0.001), but there was no difference between self-stranger and
friend-stranger (p= 0.549). There was no significant effect of pair type
on group IOS scores, F(2, 82) = 0.95, p= 0.390, η2 = 0.023, thus
showing an equivalent perceived overlap between the three teams.3
Table 1
Mean RT scores for correct responses and proportions of correct responses in Experiment 1, and mean d prime and response criterion scores (Experiment 1).
Shape RT (ms) matched RT (ms) mismatched Accuracy matched Accuracy mismatched D prime RC
Self 643.49 (66.46) 753.23 (72.77) 0.89 (0.09) 0.80 (0.13) 2.33 (0.85) −0.19 (0.35)
Friend 706.52 (84.38) 756.98 (69.64) 0.82 (0.12) 0.78 (0.13) 1.89 (0.83) −0.06 (0.30)
Stranger 740.18 (73.30) 746.07 (65.80) 0.73 (0.16) 0.81 (0.13) 1.71 (0.93) 0.19 (0.29)
Team 640.73 (70.36) 742.46 (75.89) 0.91 (0.07) 0.82 (0.16) 2.66 (1.19) −0.21 (0.34)
Rival 708.70 (90.26) 743.23 (73.25) 0.79 (0.16) 0.78 (0.15) 1.84 (0.98) −0.02 (0.31)
Neutral 709.89 (70.04) 737.40 (70.64) 0.80 (0.13) 0.79 (0.16) 1.83 (0.85) −0.02 (0.30)
Note. SDs in parentheses; RC denotes Response Criterion.
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Fig. 2. The correlation between the self and team RT advantages relative to ‘non-self’ and
‘non-team’ (Experiment 1).
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These results demonstrate a different pattern of responses for self-
reported distance and overlap between the personal and group labels.
Self and friend were rated as closer and as having greater overlap than
self-stranger and friend-stranger, but there were no such differences for
team ratings, with similar closeness and overlap between all three. This
may explain why we observed a significant difference between friend
and stranger in the matching task, but not between neutral and rival
teams. There may also be implications here for the relations between
the bias scores – friend and stranger baselines to self may not be
equivalent to neutral and rival baselines to team in calculating the
advantage scores. It is possible that these non-equivalent baselines
could obscure a stronger relationship between the self and in-group
biases.
2.3. Discussion: experiment 1
This first experiment explored the relationship between the self and
team advantages in perceptual matching identified by Sui et al. (2012)
and Moradi et al. (2015). In two separate perceptual matching tasks, we
replicated the self and team advantage effects and also demonstrated a
positive correlation between the two for RT data. The positive corre-
lation between the self and team advantages in reaction time supports
the view that there is an overlap between cognitive representations of
the self and of important in-groups (Coats et al., 2000; Smith et al.,
1999; Smith & Henry, 1996). Evidence for this was previously de-
monstrated using a trait judgment paradigm in which participants were
faster to respond to self-descriptions that matched the in-group than to
those that did not (e.g., Smith & Henry, 1996). Our results contribute to
this line of research by demonstrating that similar effects hold for lower
level, attentional and perceptual processes, indicating that a cognitive
overlap between self and in-group representation is the source of shared
advantage effects in lower-level cognition (i.e., perceptual benefits). By
utilising the perceptual matching paradigm designed by Sui et al.
(2012) using neutral shapes, these results also remove the possible role
that familiarity of the target stimulus might play in, for example, jud-
ging traits relating to the self or to the in-group.
It could be argued here that the self-team advantage correlation
does not necessarily imply a shared cognitive representation and that,
for example, any form of perceptual bias demonstrated under this
paradigm might be correlated by nature of the design. Or, alternatively,
it may be suggested that the self and team advantages are both driven
by something else, such as positive emotion or reward. Prior research,
however, shows that this is unlikely to be the case. There is evidence to
suggest that high reward values modulate attentional processes in the
same way as social relevance does (e.g., Anderson & Yantis, 2013),
which has caused speculation that prioritisation for the self (and, by
extension, the in-group) simply reflects intrinsic reward (Northoff &
Hayes, 2011). Examining this argument, Sui et al. (2012) found that
high reward stimuli (e.g., £8 as opposed to £0.50) modulated percep-
tual matching in the same way that self-stimuli did, with enhanced
performance and weaker stimulus degradation effects for high than low
reward shape associations. However, exploration of the interaction
between self bias and reward bias found no correlation between the
two, implying that although self and reward tagging yielded similar
effects, they are actually driven by distinct processes (Sui & Humphreys,
2015). That no correlation was found between self and high reward
advantages in the perceptual matching task also shows both that the
self-team advantages are not necessarily correlated by nature of the
design and also that they reflect something distinct from reward. Fur-
ther to this, Stolte et al. (2017) found that associating stimuli to positive
emotion also modulated performance on the same perceptual matching
paradigm, with performance enhanced for the stimuli associated with
the most positive emotion (e.g., ‘happy’ over ‘neutral’ and ‘sad’). Again,
while self biases and positive emotion biases were correlated within
themselves over two sessions, showing a reliable, trait-like measure,
they were not correlated with each other within the same individuals.
The authors concluded that as they had matched the two tasks as clo-
sely as possible, the lack of correlation between self and positive
emotion advantages suggests distinct processes involved in driving the
two kinds of advantage effects.
That the self and team advantages in RT were correlated is con-
sistent with an underlying overlap between self and in-group re-
presentation. It must be noted, though, that there was no such re-
lationship between the self and team advantages in sensitivity, implying
that the self and team prioritisation effects, although likely to be re-
lated, may not in fact reflect entirely the same process. However, two
potential problems with measuring the relations between the self and
team advantages, arising from the design of Experiment 1, should be
noted. Separate matching tasks were used to measure the two ad-
vantages and task performance was always improved with practice in
the second task. This meant that the self or team accuracy advantage in
the second task tended to be smaller as overall sensitivity increased.
Potential correlations between self and team advantages in sensitivity
may then have been obscured by task order effects. Similarly, the use of
different ‘other’ shape associations made within the self and team-as-
sociation tasks may have reduced the self-team correlations. For ex-
ample, responding to self when the other shapes are stranger and friend
may cause a different response pattern to responding to team when the
other shapes are rival and neutral team names. The personal distance
and IOS data reflect the fact that the relationship between self and
friend or self and stranger is not conceptually the same as between team
and rival or team and non-rival. On these measures, we found that self
and friend were rated as much closer than own team and a non-rival
team, while there was more perceived distance and less overlap be-
tween self and stranger than between own team and a rival and own
team and a non-rival team. It seems that rival and neutral team cate-
gories fall somewhere between a stranger and a friend in terms of
perceived closeness to the team, so although they elicited very similar
effects, the two tasks (self- and team-associations) may not be equiva-
lent ways of measuring the two social biases.
A second experiment attempted to address the limitations associated
with task order and the contrast of self and team shapes with potentially
non-equivalent ‘other’ shapes by including self, stranger, team and rival
shape associations within the same task. This design also allowed us to
Table 2
Mean Personal Distance and Inclusion of Other in the Self scores, and correlation coefficients for the relationship between each measure (Experiment 1).
Mean PD (SD) Mean IOS (SD) Correlation r (p)
Self-Friend 1.40 (1.97) 5.55 (1.31) −0.407 [−0.700, 0.131] (0.008)
Friend-Stranger 8.82 (4.01) 1.76 (1.03) −0.377 [−0.593, −0.158] (0.015)
Self-Stranger 9.26 (3.80) 1.61 (0.85) −0.429 [−0.647, −0.168] (0.005)
Team-Neutral 5.82 (3.23) 2.71 (1.70) −0.536 [−0.697, −0.349] (< 0.001)
Neutral-Rival 7.14 (3.77) 2.28 (1.50) −0.378 [−0.607, −0.084] (0.014)
Team-Rival 7.30 (3.86) 2.57 (1.48) −0.605 [−0.778, −0.358] (< 0.001)
Note. SDs in parentheses; PD denotes Personal Distance, and IOS Inclusion of Other in the Self.
3 There were no significant correlations between the PD and IOS scores and the self and
team-oriented biases in RT or in sensitivity.
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explore whether the self and team biases remained constant in the
presence of one another. Additionally, we were able to look directly at
an overlap between self and in-group representation by comparing
specific combinations of self and team mismatched pairs. Our second
experiment included self-reported measures of group identification to
explore the potential moderating effects of these measures on the self-
group relationship, and also included an implicit association task to
assess whether the team advantage was supported by positive valence
associated with the team.
3. Experiment 2
3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Participants
As for Experiment 1, college rowers were recruited by email ad-
vertisements. A total of 31 rowers (20 female, mean age = 22.19 ±
0.6) from a range of college rowing teams completed the experiment,
all of whom were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. Informed consent was again obtained from all participants.
3.1.2. Stimuli and tasks
In a modified version of the perceptual matching task that was used
in the first experiment, self, stranger, team and rival team labels were
each paired with a different geometric shape and these associations
were again counterbalanced across participants. Participants were
again instructed that they would have to judge whether shape-label
pairings presented on the screen were correctly or incorrectly matched
according to the initial associations. This time, self- and team-associa-
tions were included within the same blocks within the same task. There
were eight conditions in total (self/stranger/team/rival x matched/
mismatched), with 72 trials per condition. The whole task took between
15 and 20 min and exactly the same experimental parameters were
used as in the first experiment.
3.1.3. Questionnaire measures
Measures of identity fusion (designed to capture connectedness
between the personal and social self) were obtained using the 7-item
verbal scale developed by Gómez et al. (2011). Measures of group
identification were obtained using Leach et al.'s (2008) 14-item multi-
component scale that identifies five components of in-group identifi-
cation: individual self-stereotyping, in-group homogeneity, solidarity,
satisfaction and centrality. The five components make up a two-di-
mensional model such that solidarity, satisfaction and centrality un-
derlie ‘self-investment’ (a bond with the in-group, positive feelings
about in-group membership and the importance and salience of the in-
group to the individual) while individual self-stereotyping and in-group
homogeneity underlie ‘self-definition’ (the perception of the self as si-
milar to an in-group prototype and of in-group members sharing com-
monalities).
3.1.4. Implicit association task
In addition to the perceptual matching task, participants also per-
formed an adapted version of the self-esteem implicit association task
(Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), which assessed automatic associations
of team and rival categories with positive and negative valence. In the
task, participants were asked to press a left or right key (E or I) in order
to categorise words that appeared in the centre of the screen, with each
side representing a different category. First, participants performed 20
trials in which they categorised words as relating to their own team
(e.g., ‘us’) and a rival team (e.g., ‘others’). In the next 20 trials, parti-
cipants grouped words as belonging to ‘pleasant’ (e.g., ‘lovely’) or
‘unpleasant’ (e.g., ‘horrible’) categories. Following this, there were 20
practice trials in which participants categorised words into target-at-
tribute combinations (e.g., team + pleasant or rival + unpleasant) that
were assigned to the same side in the first two parts, before 40 test trials
of the same nature. After this, the assignment keys for the team cate-
gories were swapped such that if the team category was on the left
before it would now appear on the right, and 20 trials provided the
same practice as described in the first step. Finally, 20 practice trials in
which the target-attribute combinations were reversed (e.g., team
+ unpleasant, rival + pleasant) were performed, followed by 40 test
trials of the same. Implicit association between the team and positive
valence is reflected in the extent to which individuals find it easier
(indicated by faster response times) to associate their own team with
pleasant items. A final D score is generated for each participant, which
consists of the standardised differences in reaction time between the
team-positive and team-negative association blocks: the greater the D,
the stronger the implicit positive association with the team.
3.1.5. Procedure
Participants first performed the perceptual matching task (described
above) in which self, stranger, team and rival labels were associated
with four different geometric shapes. After the perceptual matching
task, participants completed the Implicit Association Task and then the
group identification and identity fusion questionnaires. The experiment
took approximately 45 min and participants were remunerated at a rate
of £10 per hour for their time.
3.2. Results and discussion
3.2.1. Reaction time scores
As for Experiment 1, there were three within-subject variables: task
type (personal or group), shape category (high priority: self/team, or
low priority: stranger/rival) and match condition (matched/
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mismatched). A 2 (association type: personal/group) × 2 (priority:
high/low) × 2 matched/mismatched) repeated measures ANOVA was
used to test for the effect of shape association on RT scores.
There was no significant effect of association type on RT, showing
speed of responses to be generally similar across personal and group
associations, F(1, 30) = 0.90, p= 0.348, ηp2 = 0.029. There were
significant effects both of shape, F(1, 30) = 15.86, p < 0.001,
ηp2 = 0.346, and of match condition, F(1, 30) = 107.11, p < 0.001,
ηp2 = 0.781, with faster responses for high (M= 676.70 ± 10.69)
than low (M= 694.03 ± 9.97) priority shapes, and for matched
(M= 655.21 ± 10.08) than for mismatched (M= 715.51 ± 10.93)
pairs. There was a significant interaction between shape and match
condition, F(1, 30) = 63.50, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.679, showing the ef-
fect of shape on RT to be dependent on whether the pairs were matched
correctly or incorrectly. There was also a significant interaction be-
tween association type and shape, F(1, 30) = 4.01, p= 0.054,
ηp2 = 0.118, but not between association type and match, F(1, 30)
= 3.07, p= 0.09, ηp2 = 0.093. Finally, there was a significant three-
way interaction between association type, shape and match condition, F
(1, 30) = 6.02, p= 0.02, ηp2 = 0.167.
Paired samples t-tests performed separately on matched and mis-
matched conditions for each association type found that for matched
pairs, self shapes were responded to significantly faster than stranger
shapes, t(30) = 4.75, p < 0.001, d= 0.85, and team shapes were re-
sponded to significantly faster than rival shapes, t(30) = 3.35,
p= 0.002, d= 0.60. For mismatched pairs, stranger shapes were re-
sponded to significantly faster than self shapes, t(30) = 2.09,
p= 0.046, d= 0.37, and rival shapes were responded to significantly
faster than team shapes, t(30) = 2.07, p= 0.047, d= 0.37. These re-
sults show that self and team shapes were responded to significantly
faster than stranger and rival shapes, but only under matched condi-
tions. For mismatched conditions, stranger and rival shapes were re-
sponded to significantly faster than self and team shapes; however this
effect was smaller. See Fig. 3a for a bar chart depicting RTs for matched
and mismatched trials under each shape condition, and Table 3 for
mean (SD) scores.
3.2.2. D prime and response criterion
A 2 (association type: personal or group) × 2 (shape: high or low
priority) repeated measures ANOVA found no significant effect of as-
sociation type, F(1, 30) = 2.72, p= 0.109, ηp2 = 0.083, showing sen-
sitivity to be similar for personal- and group-related shapes. There was
a significant effect of shape, F(1, 30) = 5.60, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.484,
with greater sensitivity for self and team (‘high priority’) shapes than
for stranger and rival (‘low priority’) shapes. There was no significant
interaction between association type and shape, F(1, 30) = 0.04,
p= 0.834, ηp2 = 0.001, showing that the effect of shape was not de-
pendent on whether it was self- or team-related. Thus, sensitivity was
higher for self in comparison to stranger and also for team in compar-
ison to rival. See Fig. 3b for a bar chart depicting sensitivity scores for
each shape condition, and Table 3 for mean and standard deviation
(SD) scores.
A similar 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA for C found a significant
effect of association type, F(1, 30) = 4.90, p= 0.035, ηp2 = 0.140,
with a lower C for group (M=−0.06 ± 0.04) than for personal
(M= 0.05 ± 0.04) associations. There was also a significant effect of
shape, F(1, 30) = 39.77, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.570, with a lower C for
high than for low priority shapes. There was a marginal interaction
between association type and shape, F(1, 30) = 3.234, p= 0.082,
ηp2 = 0.097. Paired samples t-tests found that the C for self was sig-
nificantly lower than for stranger t(30) = 5.47, p < 0.001, d= 0.98,
and the C for team was significantly lower than for rival t(30) = 2.566,
p= 0.016, d= 0.46. The effect size for the difference in C between self
and stranger was twice that of the difference between team and rival.
Table 3 reports the mean RT values under each condition, the propor-
tion of correct responses, along with the mean d prime and response
criterion values.
3.2.3. The relationship between self- and team-associated stimuli
An advantage for stranger over self and for rival over team shapes
for mismatched pairs implied that it was easier for participants to say
‘no’ to incorrectly paired ‘other’ shapes than incorrectly paired self and
team shapes. To explore this effect further, performance scores to spe-
cific mismatched shape-label combinations were compared with each
other. If an in-group is represented as part of the self, then we might
expect slower RTs when responding ‘no’ to a self-team mismatched pair
than a self-rival mismatched pair, as the latter is more obviously in-
congruent. Paired-samples t-tests were used to determine if there was a
difference in RT between self shapes paired with team labels and self
shapes paired with rival labels.4
Correct responses were significantly slower when self shapes were
presented with team labels than with rival labels, t(30) = 3.09,
p= 0.004, d= 0.55, indicating that participants were more hesitant to
reject these as correctly-matched pairs (or were faster to perceive a
mismatch between self and rival). However, there was no difference in
RTs between team shapes presented with self labels than with stranger
labels, t(30) = 0.71, p= 0.485, d= 0.13.
Table 3
Mean RT scores for correct responses and proportions of correct responses under matched and mismatched trials and mean d prime and response criterion values (Experiment 2).
Shape RT (ms) (matched) RT (ms) (mismatched) Accuracy (matched) Accuracy (mismatched) d prime RC
Self 626.84 (74.62) 719.27 (65.10) 0.87 (0.12) 0.83 (0.09) 1.99 (1.11) −0.35 (0.44)
Stranger 695.02 (74.15) 707.54 (61.31) 0.72 (0.17) 0.85 (0.12) 1.34 (1.39) 0.03 (0.59)
Team 642.57 (71.63) 718.44 (66.15) 0.88 (0.11) 0.83 (0.10) 2.13 (1.26) −0.28 (0.55)
Rival 663.50 (54.45) 709.05 (62.05) 0.80 (0.14) 0.84 (0.09) 1.71 (1.21) −0.03 (0.42)
Note. SDs in parentheses; RC denotes Response Criterion.
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Fig. 4. The positive relationship between the difference in RT between self-team and self-
rival mismatched pairs and identity fusion.
4 There were 24 trials per specific mismatched condition (3 mismatched labels per
shape = 72 total).
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3.2.4. Group identification measures
There were no significant correlations between the team advantage
in RT and self-reported measures of identity fusion, r(31)= 0.171
[−0.257, 0.546], p= 0.359, self-definition r(31)= 0.017 [−0.297,
0.332], p= 0.928, and self-investment, r(31)=−0.100 [−0.504,
0.304], p= 0.593, indicating that the prioritisation effect did not
simply reflect explicit attitudes to the group.
However, if identity fusion measures the extent to which the self is
at one with the group, then we might expect those higher in self-re-
ported feelings of fusion to show greater overlap in perception between
newly-learned self and in-group shapes. To test this hypothesis, the
difference in RT between self-team (shape-label) and self-rival (shape-
label) mismatched conditions was taken as an indicator of how much
more difficult participants found discriminating self from team than self
from rival. We then investigated whether these difference scores were
related to measures of identity fusion and group identification. A
greater difference between responses to self-team and self-rival condi-
tions (with a larger score indicating greater difficulty in discriminating
self from team) was positively correlated with self-reported measures of
identity fusion, r(31)= 0.380 [0.021, 0.651], p= 0.035, and self-in-
vestment, r(31)= 0.372 [0.002, 0.645], p= 0.040, and marginally
positively correlated with self-definition, r(31)= 0.303 [−0.079,
0.646], p= 0.086. Fig. 4 depicts the relationship between the self-
group overlap (indicated by a greater difference between self-team and
self-rival pairs) and identity fusion.
3.2.5. Implicit association tests
We also assessed whether the team advantages in accuracy and
reaction time in the perceptual matching task were associated with
implicit positive attitudes to the team. All participants showed a
moderate to strong preference for their own team compared to the rival
team, meaning that they found it easier to associate positive attributes
with their own team name (Mean IAT score = 0.84 ± 0.05). However,
there were no correlations between the team advantage (in relation to
rival) and the IAT score either in reaction time (r(26) =−0.180
[−0.527, 0.154], p= 0.379) or in sensitivity (r(26) =−0.158
[−0.519, 0.284], p= 0.440), suggesting that preference for the team
in the perceptual matching task was not associated with positive va-
lence. Scatterplots depicting this are shown below in Fig. 5a and b.
3.3. Discussion: experiment 2
Experiment 2 aimed to provide a cleaner design with which to ex-
plore the self and team advantages in the perceptual matching task by
eliminating task order effects and providing the same social compar-
isons for self and team responses. Self, friend, stranger and rival shape
associations were made within one task and we also included explicit
measures of group identification. An implicit association measure was
also used to look at the relationship between positive valence and the
team performance advantage to assess whether positive emotion plays a
role in driving the in-group bias effect. Under the 4-shape matching
task, we found that performance was enhanced for both the self and the
team shapes in comparison to stranger and rival shapes. An analysis of
the mismatched trials demonstrated that responses to self shapes paired
with team labels were responded to more slowly and with a higher error
rate than self shapes paired with rival labels, pointing to a difficulty in
discriminating self- from team-associated stimuli. This effect was
stronger in individuals reporting higher levels of identity fusion and
group identification. There was no correlation between the team ad-
vantage scores and implicit positive valence associated with the team,
suggesting that the team advantage effects are not rooted in emotion.
The performance disadvantage in discriminating self from team
stimuli (as opposed to self from rival stimuli) again provided evidence
for a shared representation of self and in-group information (e.g., Smith
et al., 1999). This argument is further supported by the fact that this
effect was stronger in individuals with higher reported levels of identity
fusion (and also self investment and self definition). Evidence for the
effects of self-reported identity fusion on the self-group perceptual
overlap is consistent with previous findings showing that stronger ef-
fects of the self-group overlap in trait recognition were correlated with
explicit measures of group identification (Coats et al., 2000).
In our second experiment, the pattern of results showed a clear
advantage for self and team-associated shapes, but performance for
rival shapes was also better than performance for stranger shapes. The
same pattern was observed in our first experiment in which responses
for rival shapes were more equivalent to responses for friend than
stranger shapes. These results may reflect the fact that college rowing
team rivalries are friendly ones and team members are likely to know
one another. Furthermore, all members of both teams are students at
the same university, who share similarities with each other, meaning
that the ‘out-group’ (rival team) may not be perceived as that dissimilar
to the in-group or, indeed, the self. The scores from the personal dis-
tance and IOS scales from Experiment 1 support the notion that the
rival team is subjectively perceived as somewhere between a friend and
a stranger: rival teams were on average marked as being closer to and
having greater overlap with the team than a stranger with the self, but
as being less close and having a smaller overlap with the team than a
friend with the self. Perhaps, then, the enhanced performance shown
for the rival team in the second experiment reflects that there is still a
certain camaraderie with the rival team. Alternatively, the enhanced
attention paid to rival in comparison to stranger may reflect threat
attached to the rival team (e.g., Bishop, 2008). That the PD and IOS
scores obtained in Experiment 1 suggest a greater perceived distance
and smaller overlap between team and rival than self and friend pairs
suggests that enhanced performance for rival in comparison to stranger
shapes does not necessarily reflect friendship. However, similar
a) Team advantage in RT and IAT
score (Experiment 2):
b) Team advantage in sensitivity and IAT
score (Experiment 2):
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responses for rival and neutral teams are not indicative of the enhanced
performance for the rival team reflecting threat, either, because then
we would expect performance to be enhanced for rival over neutral.
Future research would benefit from utilising different exemplars of
social groups such as nationalities or religions to explore this rival-as-
friend versus rival-as-threat question.
There is evidence to suggest that emotional salience can guide at-
tention and modulate early perceptual processing (Schupp, Junghöfer,
Weike, & Hamm, 2003). This has led to speculation that it could be the
emotional significance of the team identity that drives the team effect of
perceptual matching such that team-associated shapes acquire a posi-
tive emotional tag (e.g., Moradi et al., 2015). We investigated this by
using an implicit measure of positive valence associated with the team
(adapted from the self-esteem implicit association task developed by
Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). No correlation was found between the
team advantage performance in the matching task and the implicit
association score and accordingly, we suggest that the team advantage
in perceptual matching is not underpinned by emotional or motiva-
tional factors. A similar conclusion has recently been drawn by Stolte
et al. (2017) concerning the self advantage in perceptual matching.
They examined perceptual matching of shapes associated with personal
labels (self, friend and stranger) and of faces with different emotional
expressions (happy, neutral, sad). There were advantages in matching
for both self-related stimuli and stimuli associated with positive emo-
tion and valence. However, the two advantage effects did not correlate
even though each was stable in individuals across time (test-retest ef-
fects correlated for each measure separately). Stolte et al. (2017) con-
cluded that the benefit in perceptual matching for self stimuli does not
stem from associated positive valence. We draw the same conclusion for
the team advantage effect and suggest instead that the self and team
biases in visual attention are driven by unique processes involved in
self-representation.
4. General discussion
Across two experiments, we found a performance advantage in
perceptual matching for self and team-associated shapes compared to
friend, stranger, rival and non-rival (neutral) shapes, replicating results
reported by Sui et al. (2012) and Moradi et al. (2015). We demonstrated
a positive relationship between the self and team performance ad-
vantages in reaction time (but not in sensitivity) and we also found
there to be more difficulty (manifested in slower RT and higher error
rate) in discriminating self from team stimuli than self from rival sti-
muli. Further, this effect was positively correlated with self-reported
measures of identity fusion and in-group identification. Finally, there
was no relationship between implicit positive valence associated with
the team and the team performance advantage, suggesting that the
effect is not driven by positive emotion.
We suggest that the self and team perceptual prioritisation effects
are driven by a shared mental representation of self and in-group such
that the cognitive structure of the self extends to incorporate important
social groups. This is consistent with the central premise of social
identity theory and its successors, which hold that the psychological self
extends to incorporate social in-groups such that group membership is
inextricably linked with self-concept (e.g., Tajfel, 1982; Turner et al.,
1987). While social identity theory has long held the concept of the in-
group as an extension of the self (e.g., Tajfel, 1982), experimental
evidence for this has often relied on self-report measures and trait
judgments, which are not entirely protected from demand character-
istics or familiarity effects. Results from the perceptual matching
paradigm provide an implicit measure of self-group overlap without
relying on familiar stimuli. While there is an argument to say that
differential familiarity within the targets remain – for example, that
greater familiarity with in-group labels could have helped with the
perceptual matching judgments – similar experiments utilising the
minimal group paradigm have elicited the same effects, thus
demonstrating an in-group bias in perceptual matching in the total
absence of familiarity (Enock, Sui, Humpreys, & Hewstone, 2017). On a
similar note, it could be suggested that differences in word usage fre-
quency could explain, in part, the self and team advantage effects and
the relations between the two. For example, if the difference in fre-
quency of the word ‘you’ in relation to the word ‘stranger’ is greater
than the difference between the team name and the rival name, this
could act as a potential confound in interpreting differences in re-
sponses to stranger and rival shape-label pairs. However, again based
on subsequent work, differences in frequency of word usage between
our social labels is unlikely to be a problem. Using minimal groups, for
which the team names would have been equally (un)familiar to parti-
cipants, similar advantages for the team were found. Furthermore, ef-
fects of word frequency were controlled for by Sui et al. (2012), who
found no difference in effects when ‘you’ (high frequency word) was
replaced with ‘yourself’, which actually has a lower frequency usage
value than ‘friend’ and ‘other’.
Our results are in line with the connectionist model of self and in-
group representations put forward by Smith et al. (1999), who observed
an RT facilitation for trait judgments on which the self matched the
partner or the in-group. A cognitive overlap in self, partner and in-
group representations was proposed to account for these results. The
connectionist model, proposed by Smith et al. (1999), strengthened the
argument that representations of self and others are not stored as iso-
lated and independent structures but are linked by direct connections
indicating the strength of relationship and also by indirect connections
through commonly shared traits. Our results offer further support to
this interpretation by showing novel evidence for shared self and in-
group processes in lower level forms of cognition (i.e., perceptual
matching), distinct from higher-level forms of decision-making such as
trait judgments. In line with the facilitation effect of self and in-group
items on judgments to one another, it would be interesting for future
research to explore how self-related stimuli are facilitated by group-
related stimuli and vice versa in perceptual tasks similar to the ones
used in the present research. For example, would we observe re-
dundancy gains, the improvements in performance in response to
multiple, redundant stimuli versus single stimuli, in self-directed re-
sponses in perceptual matching if in-group associated stimuli were
presented simultaneously? The stronger relationship between the self
and group overlap found in those who reported higher levels of identity
fusion and of group identification further supports the conclusion that
the relationship reflects a shared representation that drives attentional
prioritisation for important social information. It could then be that
these basic attentional prioritisation effects drive self and in-group fa-
vouritism in higher-level processes, such as facilitation in trait judg-
ments identified by Smith and colleagues.
The results discussed both support and extend previous work by Sui
et al. (2012) and Moradi et al. (2015), who initially demonstrated the
self and in-group biases in performance on the same perceptual
matching task. While Moradi et al. (2015) utilised a sample of football
supporters to measure the team bias, we found the same effect in a
different sample of members of college rowing teams. This implies that
the in-group bias in perceptual matching is likely to be stable across a
variety of social groups and demographic of individuals. That we de-
tected no differences in performance between rival and neutral team-
associations in Experiment 1 suggests that the team effects are rooted in
in-group favouritism as opposed to out-group derogation. There would
be no difference in familiarity between the rival and the neutral team in
these instances because in the university rowing system, all teams at-
tend and row in the same regattas and participate in the same races.
Therefore, potential differences in performance to rival and neutral
teams are unlikely to be obscured by greater familiarity with the rival.
It is possible, however, that potential differences could be obscured by a
greater threat associated with the rival and this question could be ex-
plored in future research. That social bias reflects in-group favouritism
and not out-group derogation is in line with social identity theory's
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formulation, that in-group favouritism is primary and present even in
the absence of intergroup hostility or competition (e.g., Hinkle &
Brown, 1990).
Only a small advantage for the team in comparison to the rival in
Experiment 2 was detected, which demonstrates the need to explore
this effect further with a wider range of social groups. Out-groups in the
traditional sense are social groups that an individual does not identify
with. In our sample, however, individuals may perceive some similarity
between themselves and ‘out-group’ members because they are all
rowers at the same university. It would be interesting to explore whe-
ther the self-group correlations are stronger in individuals for whom the
group is an even more central part of the self-concept. While good ex-
emplars of team members, rowers are also likely to be self-focused in-
dividuals who spend a lot of time working toward goals relating to
personal success. Professional players of team sports or military per-
sonnel are likely to be much more team-oriented in their day-to-day
lives, and future research could explore how the self and team biases
(and the relations between the two) might be altered as a result.
The self-bias effect in shape-label matching originally demonstrated
by Sui et al. (2012) has been found to be associated with enhanced
activity in brain regions linked to self-representation and areas re-
sponding to stimuli with high environmental salience (the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex and the posterior superior temporal sulcus respec-
tively), while other matched shapes recruit a dorsal frontoparietal
control network (Sui et al., 2013). This fMRI research demonstrates
how tagging neutral stimuli with self-relevance directs attention and
enhances perception by activating distinct neural circuits. It would be
beneficial for future research to explore the neural correlates of the in-
group bias in the same matching task in order to compare these with the
self effects. If the self and in-group biases in visual attention are, as we
suggest, driven by a common representation, then we would expect to
see an overlap in the brain areas that are involved in both effects. As we
found that group identification affected the ability to discriminate self
from team stimuli, it would also be interesting to explore whether the
strength of neural activation common to self and in-group representa-
tion is correlated with self-report measures of group identity.
Overall, our results provide novel evidence to suggest that the ef-
fects of self and in-group relevance on attention and perceptual pro-
cessing are driven by a shared representation, in line with an overlap in
the cognitive structure of the self and important social in-groups. These
results support the connectionist model developed by Smith et al.
(1999) and also provide an argument for the idea that self and in-group
preference in high-level processes such as trait judgments are driven
bottom-up by lower level prioritisation in attention. The research gives
a strong foundation to further explore individual differences in the re-
lations between self and team oriented biases, along with the cognitive
and neural mechanisms by which these links arise.
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